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Abstract: After the implementation of Law Number 23/2014 on Regional Government in Indonesia, the 
authority for forest management rests with the central and provincial governments. This study aims to (1) 
assess forest governance performance after the implementation of this law, (2) analyse the institutional 
aspects of forest governance after the implementation of this law and (3) formulate strategies to strengthen 
forest governance institutions. This study finds that although Law Number 23/2014 has been implemented 
in North Sumatra Province, the forestry sector remains centralistic; the characteristics of forest resources 
have not changed (these continue to be common pool resources) and the behaviour of the actors lacks 
synergy. In this scenario, the performance of forest governance has not improved significantly, as indicated 
by the incomplete designation of forest areas; the number of Kesatuan Pengelolaan Hutan that have not 
implemented the Badan Layanan Umum Daerah scheme; the low rights of access and low forest utilisation 
by the community; and the slow service process for permits; however, the costs for obtaining permits are 
according to regulations. This is in line with the results of this study’s institutional analysis, which show that 
(1) the provincial jurisdiction boundaries have narrowed, given that only the central government has 
authority over the forestry planning sub-function and forestry supervision; (2) many central government 
regulations continue to be used in forest management, characterising the low aspect of provincial regional 
representation rules; and (3) despite clear forest ownership rights, there are claims from other stakeholders, 
which indicates the low legitimacy of the parties. This study suggests that forest governance performance 
can be improved by expanding the jurisdiction boundaries through the assistance task mechanism to the 
provincial government; ensuring provincial government participation in formulating forest policies; and 
increasing the status of forest permit holders and managers from claimants to proprietors. 




In aiming to achieve decentralisation, Indonesia implemented Law Number 32/2004 on 
Regional Government to decentralise the authority to manage forest resources from the central 
government to the provincial and the regency governments. Regency governments were authorised 
to manage forest areas within their administrative areas through actions such as planning forest 
management, issuing forest utilisation permits, rehabilitating and reforesting forest areas, 
protecting forests and empowering the communities near forests (Simarmata & Firdaus, 2016). The 
implementation of this law resulted in Indonesia’s forest governance being included in the bad-to-
medium category (Indrarto et al., 2012; Kartikasari et al., 2012; United Nations Development 
Programme [UNDP] Indonesia, 2013, 2015). Further, Rahman et al. (2013), Indonesian Center for 
Environmental Law and Sekretariat Nasional Forum Indonesia untuk Transparansi Anggaran 
(SEKNAS FITRA, 2015) and Handayani et al. (2019) also found that forest management by regency 
governments typically failed to achieve the principles of good forest governance (GFG). This 
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situation illustrates that, in the decentralisation era, forest management performance in Indonesia, 
both at the central and local levels, did not fully comply with GFG principles. 
GFG is interpreted as structuring the mechanism of the interrelationships of actors in forest 
management through various controlling instruments to achieve common goals associated with 
managing forest resources, providing goods and services in a sustainable manner and supporting 
community prosperity (Nugroho, 2013; Secco et al., 2014). GFG is significantly influenced by the 
institutional of forest governance. The institutional is defined as the rules, norms, prohibitions, 
contracts, policies and regulations that regulate and control the behaviour of individuals in society 
or organisations to reduce uncertainty in controlling their environment and to inhibit the emergence 
of opportunistic behaviour and mutual harm for ensuring more predictable human behaviour 
towards maximising individual prosperity (North, 1990; Nugroho, 2016; Peters, 2000). However, in 
the institutional context of Indonesia, GFG has not yet been achieved in the forestry sector,  
generally because of institutional failures in forest management. First, the regulations have failed to 
address key problems, have incurred high implementation costs, have been susceptible to being 
affected by the behaviour of uncontrolled actors and have not specified well-defined property 
rights. Second, organisational capacity is weak, meaning that institutions are unable to implement 
existing rules owing to low human resource capacity, limited funding support, lack of community 
participation in decision-making and lack of accountability mechanisms (North, 1990; Nugroho, 
2013; Peters, 2000). 
In addition, Law Number 32/2004 had a weakness in that governors could not regulate the 
issuance of mining, marine and forestry permits by the regency/local governments. This limitation 
led to severe environmental damage due to the overexploitation of natural resources by 
regency/municipality governments in order to increase local revenues. Even in the case of forest 
function conversion, misappropriation often occurred, and the officials involved tended to engage 
in corrupt practices, causing the state to lose revenues. The implementation of Law Number 
32/2004 also often created uncertainty in the division of governmental affairs between the central 
government and the provincial regions, resulting in conflict and overlapping authorities (Colfer & 
Capistrano, 2005; Moeliono et al., 2008; Ministry of Home Affairs [MoHA], 2011). Therefore, this 
situation prompted the issuance of Law Number 23/2014 on Regional Government as a substitute 
for Law Number 32/2004 (Simarmata & Firdaus, 2016). 
The implementation of Law Number 23/2014 has led to a substantial change in regulations 
regarding the division of forest management authority, and it places forests under the jurisdiction 
of the central and provincial governments. At the provincial level, forest management units or 
Kesatuan Pengelolaan Hutan (KPHs) are being established to manage forests at the site level. This 
has resulted in a loss of focus on regional autonomy in forest management by the 
regency/municipality. In other words, the provisions about forestry affairs in Law Number 23/2014 
are an effort to re-centralise forest management (Maryudi, 2016; Sahide et al., 2016; Setyarso et al., 
2014; UNDP Indonesia, 2015). Although provinces have a provincial government that has 
considerable authority, it is actually an extension of the central government through the concept of 
deconcentration.1 Thus, the implementation of Law Number 23/2014 extends the provincial 
regions’ range of control and effectiveness of forest management at a time when the readiness of 
the KPH, as the site-level forest manager, remains low. Thus, the law becomes an obstacle in 
improving forest governance performance (Simarmata & Firdaus, 2016). 
During the implementation of Law Number 32/2004 (until 2014) in North Sumatra Province, 
forest management was affected by some crucial issues, including the incomplete designation of 
forest areas, community claims and conflicts over these areas, the encroachment and conversion of 
forest areas, illegal logging activities, low human resource capacity to enforce the law, conflicts 
between communities and wildlife and weak law enforcement (Corruption Eradication 
Commission/Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi [KPK], 2012; Indonesian Center for Environmental Law 
 
1 Deconcentration is the delegation of part of governmental affairs, which is the authority of the central government to 
the governor as the representative of the central government, to vertical agencies in certain areas, and/or to the governor 
and the regent/mayor as the person in charge of general government affairs (Law Number 23/2014 Article 1 section (9)). 
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& SEKNAS FITRA, 2015; Indrarto et al., 2012; UNDP Indonesia, 2015 ). However, those problems 
persist even after the implementation of Law Number 23/2014 (Basyuni et al., 2018; Forestry Service 
of North Sumatra Province, 2019; Handayani et al., 2019). 
Given that the implementation of Law Number 23/2014 has not overcome forest management 
problems, such as the increasing burden on provincial forest management due to spillovers from 
regencies/municipalities and the lack of readiness of the provinces to perform their assigned 
responsibilities, as well as the decentralisation of forest management, certain questions are raised: 
How effective is the current forest management, which used to be carried out by 
regencies/municipalities earlier? How do provinces plan, manage and prepare forest governance 
rules and policies? How do provinces develop innovations to improve forest governance 
performance? 
Experiences from various countries show that the division of forest management authority 
between the central and local governments in a decentralised system is very dynamic. In this case, 
there are three requirements to develop an effective decentralised system that is able to improve 
forest governance performance: (1) an appropriate, effective division of authority in making 
decisions and collecting revenues based on the capabilities and needs of each government level; (2) 
effective law enforcement and accountability at all government levels to ensure that government 
agencies fairly and efficiently carry out their mandates; and (3) effective linkages with other sectors 
that affect, or are influenced by, the forestry sector (Colfer & Capistrano, 2005; Food and Agriculture 
Organization Program on Forests, 2011). In contrast, efforts to change institutions and to separate 
forest management authority between the central and local governments are sometimes not 
followed by a renewal of the philosophical foundation and framework used. Consequently, 
regulations and institutions have increased and the names of institutions are often changed, but the 
type of policies implemented has not changed, which thus does not change the onsite performance 
(Kartodihardjo, 2006; 2008). 
Although these problems are complicated, forest management authority has shifted from the 
regency/municipality government to the provincial government after Law Number 23/2014 was 
implemented. In this case, the provincial government is unable to automatically solve forest 
management problems, which would result in improved forest governance performance. Therefore, 
the increase in provincial authority must be accompanied by institutional strengthening and 
innovation. This step is important because it is essential to improve forest governance performance 
by the provincial government. In addition, other reasons for the importance of institutional 
strengthening include the following: Forest governance performance is influenced by various rules, 
both formal and informal (i.e. institutional structure); forest resources are easily accessible and open 
to all parties (i.e. resource characteristics) and actors’ responses and behaviour (i.e. actor 
behaviours) vary according to their interests and powers (Kartodihardjo, 2006, 2013; Nugroho, 
2013, 2016; Ostrom, 2008; Reed et al., 2009). 
The institutional framework approach that Nugroho (2016) developed considers that 
performance achievement is closely related to the relationship and the mutual influence between 
institutional components, namely, institutional structure, resource characteristics and actor 
behaviour. Further, Pakpahan (1989) and Kartodihardjo (2008) stated that three institutional 
aspects play a key role in achieving successful governance performance: jurisdictional boundaries, 
rules of representation and ownership rights. Therefore, in this study, we aim to (1) assess the 
achievement of forest governance performance after the implementation of Law Number 23/2014 
in North Sumatra Province, (2) analyse the institutional aspects of forest governance after the 
implementation of this law and (3) formulate strategies for strengthening forest governance 
institutions. 
2. Research Methods 
2.1 Research Location 
We conducted this study in North Sumatra Province, focusing on the North Sumatra Provincial 
Forestry Service. The sample of this study is the Technical Implementation Unit (Unit Pelaksana 
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Teknis or UPT) of the Forest Service, including KPH Region I Stabat (Langkat Regency), KPH Region 
IX Panyabungan (Mandailing Natal Regency) and KPH Region X Padang Sidempuan (South Tapanuli 





















Figure 1. Research location 
2.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
We used a mixed methods approach to collect quantitative data (e.g. through content and 
document analyses, and a survey) and qualitative data (e.g. through interviews and focus group 
discussions [FGDs]) from January to December 2018. We conducted interviews and FGDs with 
stakeholders involved in forest governance. The key respondents for each stakeholder ranged from 
two to five individuals. For more details on the quantitative and qualitative data we used in this 
study, see Table 1. 
The data collection process comprised the following stages: 
Identifying the applicable regulations and policies related to forest governance (focusing on aspects 
of the division of authority in forest management, especially under Law Number 23/2014). 
1) Analysing the content of the rules and policies related to forest governance. In the content 
analysis approach, researchers try to analyse/evaluate text data, images and expressions that 
are created to be read, interpreted and have meaning. The main point of this analysis approach 
is to identify patterns and to classify and evaluate text manifestations (Handoyo et al., 2013) 
2) Analysing changes in the characteristics of forest resources as common pool resources (CPRs). 
This analysis is important because the resource characteristics influence and determine the 
relationships between actors and influence their behaviour in taking advantage of forest 
resources. 
3) Identifying actors involved in forest governance (individuals and groups) and analysing their 
behaviour, level of power/authority and interests in forest governance institutions. 
We use a descriptive method to analyse the relationship between the implementation of Law 
Number 23/2014 and forest governance performance. In this case, Law Number 23/2014 was 
effective in improving forest governance performance, owing to the complex problems in forest 
management as regards policy, forest resources and human resources. Therefore, for the analysis 
in this study, we use a multi-factor framework with the institutional analysis model that Nugroho 
(2016) developed. Performance achievement is influenced by three institutional components: 
institutional structure, resource characteristics and actor behaviour. The first two components will 
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influence each other. Both components will influence actors, which in turn, will affect institutional 
performance (Figure 2). 
 





Quantitative Content analysis Regulations and policies: Law Number 23/2014, Law Number 32/2004, 
Law Number 41/1999, The Regulation of The MoEF Number P.83/2016 
and The Regulation of The MoHA Number 79/2019 on Local Public 
Service Agency (Badan Layanan Umum Daerah or BLUD) 
Mass media news 
 Document analysis 
 
Research and document report; Provincial Forest Service Strategic Plan; 
KPH Long-Term Forest Management Plan Book; Annual Work Plan for a 
timber business licence holder, etc.). 
 Survey 
(observation) 
Stakeholder in forest governance, certainty of forest area, KPH 
operation at site level, the ratio of the use of forest areas by 
communities and corporations 
Qualitative Interview and 
focus group 
discussion (FGD) 
Characteristic of resources, interest level and behaviour of stakeholders 
in forest governance, opinion matrix of business actors about managing 





Figure 2. General framework of institutional analysis of forest governance performance after the 
implementation of Law Number 23/2014 in North Sumatra Province, Indonesia (modified 
from Nugroho, 2016) 
Institutional structures can be formal institutions (e.g. laws and regulations, property right 
rules, and contracts) or informal institutions (e.g. taboos, traditions, codes of conduct, norms and 
habits; North, 1990). Characteristics of resources include physical characteristics (e.g. availability in 
nature, productivity and economic value) and CPR characteristics (easy to exclude/excludability; 
scarcity and competition/subtractability; Ostrom, 2008; Schmid, 2004). 
Meanwhile, actors’ behaviour is interpreted as their response or reaction to the institutional 
structure and the characteristics of the natural resource utilised. Actors include governments at 
various levels, affected communities, non-government organisations, universities, corporations and 
even individuals who use the resource (Ostrom, 2005). The results of interactions and activities 
among actors in the institutional structure for certain resource characteristics would produce a 
certain performance aimed at the preservation of stocks and flow (Nugroho, 2016). The actors are 
identified by considering their position of interest and influence (power). Further, they are grouped 
as follows: (1) key actors, who have legal authority in terms of decision-making from the legislative 
element, the executive element according to their level and the elements of related agencies; (2) 
primary actors, who have a direct interest relationship or are directly affected by an activity or 
policy; they generally have a high level of importance and influence; and (3) supporting actors, who 
do not have a direct interest in an activity or policy; they have a high level of importance but a low 
level of influence (Fletcher et al., 2003). 
Resources Characteristic; 
forest resources’ 
characteristic as CPRs 
 
Performance; forest 
governance performance with 
indicators: (1) certainty of forest 
area, (2) the FMU operation at 
the site level, (3) the ratio of the 
use of forest area by community 
and corporation and (4) reduced 
unofficial costs in managing 
licence and forest utilisation 
Actors’ Behaviour; 
actor contestation on 
institutional structure 
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The results of actors’ interactions and activities in the institutional structure for a certain 
resource characteristic would produce a performance aimed at the sustainability of stock and the 
flow of benefits. Stock is related to the physical characteristics of resources, whereas flow is related 
to the characteristics of supply and consumption of a resource (Nugroho, 2016). Many indicators 
can be used to assess the forest governance performance of stock and flow, depending on the 
purpose and case (context) of the analysis. In this study, we used the following performance 
indicators of forest governance: (1) the certainty of forest area, based on forest area gazettement, 
(2) the ratio of utilisation of forest area by communities and corporations, (3) the operation of KPHs 
at the site level and (4) the reduction of unofficial costs (transaction costs) in managing permits and 
forest utilisation (Nugroho, 2016; UNDP Indonesia, 2015). 
Further, Pakpahan (1989), Kartodihardjo (2008) and Rachman (2009) stated that institutional 
structures are human innovations that help regulate or control interdependence between parties 
on forest resources through property rights, jurisdictional boundaries and rules of representation. 
Property rights explain a person’s relationship with another person through the recognition of 
resources and will determine their position in relation to the resource, whether as the owner, the 
proprietor, the claimant or the authorised user. A jurisdictional boundary determines who and what 
is covered in the organisation. The concept of jurisdictional boundaries can be interpreted as the 
limit of authority or territory of an institution in regulating resources. Rules of representation are a 
set of rules that determine the mechanism of organisational decision-making. The rules of 
representation used in the decision-making process will determine the form of decisions taken that 
will affect the institutional performance. 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Achievement of Forest Governance Performance After the Implementation of Law Number 
23/2014 in North Sumatra Province 
3.1.1 Institutional structure 
The institutional structure analysed in this study is Law Number 23/2014. Our content analysis 
approach revealed that several articles govern forest management, both directly and indirectly, 
including: 
1) Article 9 paragraph (3): Concurrent governmental affairs are governmental affairs that are 
divided between the central government and provincial and regency/municipality governments. 
2) Article 11 paragraph (1): Concurrent governmental affairs consist of mandatory and optional 
government affairs handled by regional authorities.2 
3) Article 12 paragraph (3): Optional government affairs as referred to in Article 11 paragraph (1) 
include the forestry sector. 
4) Article 14: Section (1) Government administration in the field of forestry, marine affairs, and 
energy and mineral resources is shared among the central and provincial governments, and 
section (2) Government Affairs in the forestry sector related to management of 
regency/municipal forest parks (taman hutan raya or Tahura) are under the regency/municipal 
government. 
The aforementioned articles indicate that the withdrawal of regency/municipality authority in 
forest management has resulted in the loss of focus on regional autonomy in the 
regency/municipality, including: (a) a drastic reduction in regional budgets, (b) the absence of a 
Special Regional Government Agency dealing with forestry in the regency/municipality, (c) the loss 
of regency/municipality government authority to issue regional regulations about forest 
management and (d) the loss of authority to issue various forestry permits. In addition, it has 
resulted in increasing provincial responsibilities in forest management (Simarmata & Firdaus, 2016). 
Therefore, North Sumatra Province has identified 16 KPH areas for site-level forest management 
 
2 Optional government affairs are government affairs that must be conducted by the region in accordance with the 
potential of the region (Law Number 23/2014 Article 1 point 15). 
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and has drafted regional regulations on forest area management for the Province (Forestry Service 
of North Sumatra Province, 2019). 
The division of concurrent government affairs between the central and provincial governments 
is listed in the Annex to Law Number 23/2014 (see Table 2). 
Table 2.  Illustrative diagram of the division of government affairs in the forestry sector based on 
Law No. 23/2014 
No. 
Sub-Affairs 
Central government Provincial government Regency government 
1 Forest planning - - 
2 Forest management Forest management - 
3 Conservation of resources, biological 
resources and the ecosystem 
Conservation of biological resources 
and the ecosystem 
Conservation of resources, 
biological resources and 
the ecosystem 
4 Education and training, extension 
and empowerment of society in the 
field of forestry 
Education and training, extension and 
empowerment of society in the field 
of forestry 
- 
5 Regional watershed management  Regional watershed management - 
6 Supervision of forestry - - 
Table 2 shows that the authority of the central government in the forestry sector is still greater 
than that of the provincial and district/municipality governments. The central government has 
authority over six sub-affairs, whereas the provincial governments and the district/municipality 
governments have authority over only four sub-affairs and one sub-affair, respectively. The central 
government level continues to hold high authority even after the implementation of Law Number 
23/2014, which indicates that forest management in Indonesia is centralised (Maryudi, 2016; Sahide 
et al., 2016; Simarmata & Firdaus, 2016). 
3.1.2 Resource characteristics 
In North Sumatra Province, the implementation of Law Number 23/2014 did not encourage a 
change in the characteristics of forest resources controlled by the state (state property). Forest 
resources continue to have the characteristics of CPRs (Ostrom, 2008): (1) It is difficult to exclude 
other parties (individuals) from using goods through physical barriers or legal instruments (non-
excludable); (2) the benefits consumed by one individual reduces the benefits available to others 
(subtractable); (3) it is on a wide expanse of area; and (4) it is scattered and far from the reach of 
supervision. 
After the implementation of Law Number 23/2014 in North Sumatra Province, the status of one 
forest was changed from state forest to customary (adat) forest in Humbang Hasundutan 
(Humbahas) Regency. This change in forest status was regulated in the Regional Regulation of 
Humbahas Regency Number 3/2019 dated 31 January 2019 on Recognition and Protection of the 
Customary Law Community (Masyarakat Hukum Adat or MHA) of Pandumaan-Sipituhuta, which will 
later be entitled to its own customary forest (Hutan adat or HA) area totalling 5,172 ha. It change in 
status of the forest is very important for MHA Pandumaan-Sipituhuta because it is a prerequisite for 
submitting an HA application to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF). 
By referring to the natural resources typology approach of Berge (2003) and the bundle of rights 
identified by Schlager and Ostrom (1992), the rights held by MHA Pandumaan-Sipituhuta on the HA 
can position it as the owner. That is, the owner is the party who has all the bundle of rights in the 
form of access rights (the right to enter a resource area), utilisation rights (the right to produce or 
use resources), management rights (the right to regulate the use and change the form of resources 
into certain products), exclusion rights (the right to determine who will have access) and transfer 
rights (the right to sell or lease one or more of the aforementioned rights). Further,  Alston and 
Mueller (2005) stated that the more the number of rights to an asset that a person or a group owns, 
the greater the incentive to improve the asset value through investment; thus, the greater the 
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allocation efficiency that can be expected. MHA Pandumaan-Sipituhuta is the ‘owner’ of the HA; 
however, the property rights regime is not that for a private property but that for a common 
property (i.e. collective ownership in which the right of access, use and management belongs to a 
group of clearly defined people through regional regulation). 
Thus, the change in status from state forest to HA for MHA Pandumaan-Sipituhuta does not 
change the typology of goods and services from CPRs (with non-excludable but subtractable 
characteristics) to private goods (with excludable and subtractable characteristics) (Berge, 2003). 
The typology remains unchanged because it may be difficult to exclude individuals or other 
communities who are not entitled to use HA (i.e. high exclusion cost), there may be free riders 
because HA is a natural resource that is available and ready to be used by anyone, and the HA may 
be damaged following lack of compliance with the rules that apply in the MHA. 
3.1.3 Actors’ behaviour 
The implementation of Law Number 23/2014 has encouraged many actors to participate in 
forest management. A study on forest management in North Sumatra Province identified that 23 
actors are involved in forest governance in this area (Affandi, 2020). To analyse stakeholders and 
their behaviour regarding implementing Law Number 23/2014 in North Sumatra Province, the 
present study describes a number of actors: the MoEF, the Provincial Regional People’s 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD) and the Provincial Government 
of North Sumatra, as the key actors; the Provincial Forestry Service, KPH, the licence 
holder/manager of a social forestry (SF) scheme and the licensing agent of a business that uses forest 
wood products (Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu or IUPHHK) as the primary actors; and 
non-government organisations and regency governments, as supporting actors (Fletcher et al., 
2003). 
Actors’ forest governance behaviour is their adaptation to the implementation of the 
institutional structure and the characteristics of the forest resources. Their behaviour is affected by 
the level of interest, the power and the interactions among actors in achieving the objectives of 
each actor’s activity, which will directly or indirectly affect the forest governance performance. Reed 
et al. (2009) defined interests as the motivations that drive actors’ actions. Their power is actors’ 
ability to affect others to act in accordance with their wishes. Table 3 presents details on these 
actors, their interests and power level, their commitments, and their behaviour in forest governance 
in North Sumatra Province after the implementation of Law Number 23/2014. 
An actor involved in forest management, as listed in Table 3, is the license holder of the SF 
scheme, who is affected by other regulations (institutional structure), such as Regulation of MoEF 
Number P.83/2016. Based on Regulation of MoEF Number P.83/2016, Social Forestry is a 
management rights scheme for utilising forests that the state provides to the community. In this 
rule, the licence holder/SF scheme manager must implement binding provisions, starting from the 
Licence Application Procedure for each SF scheme (Chapter II) to the provisions on the Procedure 
for Utilizing SF Areas (Chapter III), Time Period and Evaluation (Chapter IV) and Rights and 
Obligations (Chapter V). These provisions indicate a contractual relationship between the 
government (as the licensor) and the SF scheme licence holder (as the recipient of the licence/right 
of management), which will affect the behaviour of the actors in achieving the SF program’s 
objectives. 
By referring to the perspective of the relationship between the principal and the agent (agency 
theory), the MoEF is positioned as the principal (licensor) and the licence holder/manager of the SF 
scheme as an agent (licensor; Quinn, 2013). As stated in the contractual Regulation of MoEF Number 
P.83/2016, the principal makes rules about forest use in the SF scheme to be used as guidelines and 
adhered to by agents. In its provisions, agents are required to manage principal forest resources in 
accordance with principal objectives. However, since these are natural resource management 
practices with contractual relationships, the principal does not eliminate the SF schemes that 
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become national programs and do not achieve the expected goals, that is, improving prosperity, 
environmental balance and socio-cultural dynamics.3 
Table 3. Actors, interests and power level, commitments, and actors’ behaviour in forest governance 






Commitment Actor Behaviour 
Key Actors 





High High Implementing 
GFG at the 
local level 





Cooperates with the Ministry of Home Affairs to compile 
norms, procedures, standards and criteria; issues 
supporting regulations related to forest governance in 
local levels, such as: (1) The Regulation of The MoEF 
Number P. 64/2015 on procedure for authorising Long-
Term Forest Management Plan (RPHJP) of Protection KPH 
and Production KPH, (2) The Regulation of The MoEF 
Number P. 74/2016 on guidelines for the nomenclature of 
the Provincial and Regency/City Officials that perform 
forestry affairs of government, (3) The Regulation of The 
MoEF Number P.83/2016 on SF and (4) The Regulation of 
The MoEF Number P. 49/2017 on forest utilisation 














On its own initiative or in cooperation with the provincial 
government, compiles regulation on forest governance in 
accordance with NSPC; supervises and controls the 
implementation of local government regulations; drafts 
the provincial budget and the regional expenditure and 
revenue budget (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah 
















In cooperation with the Provincial Legislative Council, 
develops the provincial medium-term development plan 
and APBD Plan and issues regulation that supports GFG, 
such as: (1) The Regulation of The Governor Number 
38/2016 on Local Officials Organizational Structure of 
North Sumatra Province; based on that regulation, forest 
management organisation in North Sumatra Province was 
divided into 16 KPH areas and one Forest Park; (2) The 
Regulation of The Local Government of North Sumatra 
Province Number 2/2017 on RTRWP of North Sumatra 
year of 2017–2037; (3) the Decree of the Governor of 
North Sumatra Province Number 188.44/291/KPTS/2016 
on Integrated Corruption Eradication Program Action 
Plan; (4) The Regulation of The Governor of North 
Sumatra Province Number 19/2016 on Guidelines for 
Gratification Control in North Sumatra Province; (5) The 
Regulation of The Governor of North Sumatra Province 
Number 77/2017 on Smart Province Governance of North 
Sumatra Province; and (6) develops draft regional 
regulation on Forest Area Management of North Sumatra 





High Low Achieves GFG, 
and therefore 
the 
Responsible for provincial government affairs in forestry 
sector, that is, in the subsectors of forest management, 
the conservation of biological natural resources and the 
 
3 SF is a system of sustainable forest management implemented in state forest areas or customary forests/customary 
forests implemented by local communities or customary law communities as the primary actors to improve their 
prosperity, environmental balance and socio-cultural dynamics in the form of village forest (HD), community forest (HKm), 
community plantation forest (HTR), customary forest (HA) and forestry partnership (KK) (The Regulation of The MoEF 
P.83/2016) 
 
















ecosystem, training, counselling and community 
empowerment and river basin area management; 
conducts policy formulation, administration and also 
evaluation and reports related to provincial government 
affairs in forestry sector; prepares Provincial Forestry Plan 
(RKTP) and Strategic Plan (Renstra) of Forestry OPD; 
facilitates proposals of RPHJP and Short Term Forest 
Management Plan (RPHJPd) of KPH; and facilitates 















Prepares RPHJP and RPHJPd of KPH; performs the forest 
manager function at site level in accordance with RPHJP 
and RPHJPd prepared; prepares to be the forest manager 
at site level by applying the BLUD scheme; conducts 
community empowerment by building partnerships in 
forest management with other stakeholders in 
accordance with The Regulation of The MoEF Number 
P.83/2016 on SF and also in accordance with The 
Regulation of The MoEF Number 49/2017 on Partnership 
of Forest Utilization on KPH. 
6. Manager of 
SF scheme 
High Low Provides 
access and 
fulfils legal 






Proposes licence and management in accordance with SF 
scheme to the MoEF; manages forest area after the 
licence issued in accordance with regulation enforced in 
each SF scheme received (HKm, HTR, HD and Forestry 
Partnership); performs every task in accordance with SF 
scheme received based on The Regulation of The MoEF 
Number P.83/2016 on SF. 










Conducts business in accordance with applicable 
regulations; coordinates with the KPH as the supervisory 











Organises work programs; assists, educates and 
empowers the community to manage forest resources 
sustainably; supervises forest management and forestry 
sector licensing as social control as complements to 
formal supervision by governmental institutions. 
9 Regency 
Governments 





Not involved in forestry activity in development planning 
document; conducts village community empowerment, 
including villages around the forest through related OPD; 
and facilitates community to form groups, such as farming 
groups and BUMDes. 
Source: Compiled by authors from interview and primary research data of  2018. 
The SF objectives can fail when agents manage forests in an unsustainable manner, which is 
triggered by a conflict (difference) of interests between principal and agent. These problems can be 
eliminated by drawing up an effective contract to align the interests of the principal and the agent 
more closely. The contract should be prepared by considering all aspects that can spur performance 
improvement and strengthen the agent’s commitment to obtaining the goals desired by the 
principal. An effective contract can also minimise the likelihood of an agent’s behaviour deviating in 
its performance (moral hazard; Quinn, 2013). Further, agents bound by a contract will have to use 
their licences/management rights in accordance with the rules and characteristics of the resources 
they use, that is, forest resources, as CPRs (Nugroho, 2016). 
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3.1.4 Performance 
Performance is the level of achievement of the results or outputs of a process (Kirana & 
Ratnasari, 2017). In the context of forest management institutions, performance is the result of 
social interrelationships among actors in the institutional structure and the characteristics of forest 
resources (Nugroho, 2016). 
(1) Certainty of forest area 
The certainty of the forest area is closely related to the process of forest area gazettement, 
which clarifies land boundaries and determines forests that are village areas, community areas and 
government forest areas (Contreras-Hermosilla & Fay, 2005). In contrast, forest areas that have not 
been optimally confirmed will cause poor forest use patterns, become a path for corruption, lead to 
overlapping use of the area and result in conflicting authority among state institutions, both central–
local and intersectoral (Corruption Eradication Commission/KPK, 2012). 
Based on the Decree of the MoEF RI Number SK.579/Menhut-II/2014 on Forest Areas of North 
Sumatra Province, the total forest area in the Province was 3,055,795.00 ha. In July 2017, it was 
determined as 1,725,266.43 ha or around 56.46% (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2017). In 
accordance with Appendix of Law Number 23/2014, the forest area gazettement (as part of the 
certainty of forest areas) is only under the authority of the central government in the forest planning 
sub-affairs. Therefore, the high or low performance of the certainty of forest areas in North Sumatra 
Province is highly dependent on the high and low implementation of the forest area gazettement 
by the central government, which is marked by the widening of forest area gazettement (legality) 
and the recognition of stakeholders (legitimacy). 
Ostrom (1990) stated that of the design principles that guarantee the sustainability of forest 
resource institutions characterised by CPRs, the completion of the gazettement of all forest areas in 
North Sumatra Province is among the most important actions to be conducted by both the central 
government and the local governments. The stipulation of all forest areas will ensure clarity on the 
boundaries of the management area, so that the resources and actors are clearly defined. 
Nopiansyah (2017) argued that unclear boundaries result in the uncertainty of management space 
among actors. This finding is in line with that of Ostrom (1990), who stated that if the user and 
resource boundaries of CPRs are not clearly defined, the resource owner will face the risk of 
resource use by people who do not participate in the business of supplying and maintaining CPRs. 
The unfinished forest area gazettement in North Sumatra Province is due to not only the slow 
gazettement process of the central government but also the limited budget of the provincial 
government. The district and the community still exhibit resistance towards the forest area 
boundary. The incomplete determination of the forest area has caused increasing community 
claims, additional encroachment and the conversion of the forest area, the overlapping use of the 
forest area, illegal logging, and tenure conflicts. Therefore, the implementation of Law No. 23/2014 
has failed to help solve the problem of unclear boundary setting owing to the jurisdictional boundary 
rules that address the sub-affairs of forest planning, which resulted in the central government 
having authority over the sub-affairs of forestry supervision (Forestry Service of North Sumatra 
Province, 2019). 
Likewise, even if the forest area has been determined, it does not necessarily guarantee that it 
is free from third-party rights—third parties can still submit claims at any time even though the 
gazettement and determination of forest areas continues to run. This situation illustrates that the 
legitimacy of enacted forest areas is still categorised as low as a result of the process of forest area 
gazettement that is conducted in a non-participatory and more administrative manner (Sinabutar 
et al., 2014). 
(2) KPH operations at the site level 
KPH development was a priority for the certainty of forest area policy in the Ministry Forestry 
Strategic Plan 2010–2014 (Minister of Forestry Regulation P.51/2010). The target for KPH 
development by 2014 was to construct 120 KPH units throughout Indonesia. These targets 
continued to be developed in the 2015–2019 National Medium-Term Development Plan. During this 
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period, 120 KPH units built in the 2010–2014 era were to be operated and 600 new KPH were to be 
built throughout the Indonesian forest area. To achieve these targets, all the roles that support the 
achievement of targets need to be maximised, whereas all the obstacles that potentially hinder 
target achievement need to be minimised (Forestry Service of North Sumatra Province, 2019; 
Setyarso et al., 2014). The site-level operations of KPH were related to its development 
performance. Some criteria were used as standards for assessing KPH development performance, 
including strengthening of forest management systems, regulatory support and the internalisation 
of KPH development programs (Hernowo & Ekawati, 2014; Setyarso et al., 2014). 
The KPH management system in North Sumatra Province is based on the Decree of the Minister 
of Forestry Number: SK.102/Menhut-II/2010 dated 5 March 2010 on the Establishment of Protected 
Forest Management Unit (KPH Lindung or KPHL) and Production Forest Management Unit (KPH 
Produksi or KPHP) of North Sumatra Province. Based on this decree, the KPH unit area in North 
Sumatra Province consists of 33 KPH units divided into 14 KPHL units with an area of ± 1,364,497 ha 
and 19 units of KPHP with an area of ± 1,831,884 ha. In line with the implementation of Law Number 
23/2014, North Sumatra Governor Regulation Number 38/2016 on the Organizational Structure of 
the Local Offices of North Sumatra Province regulates the forest management in North Sumatra 
Province conducted by the KPH, which is divided into 16 KPH areas. 
Despite the formation of the KPH forest management system, local governments’ full support 
related to regulations for institutionalising KPH operations has been lacking, especially regulations 
to support KPH to become independent and professional in the Badan Layanan Umum Daerah 
(BLUD) scheme. Consequently, North Sumatra has not had a single KPH implementing the BLUD 
scheme. Nugroho and Soedomo (2016) stated that the BLUD scheme is a KPH institution that is 
intended to be a semi-governmental organisation (quasi-public) so that it is able to conduct its public 
functions as well as private or business functions. KPH institutions must be able to respond quickly 
to field needs by suppressing bureaucratic processes. In addition, through the BLUD scheme, the 
operation of the KPH will reduce financial dependence on the government and increase the 
entrepreneurship of the KPH institution. Therefore, the provincial government should mainstream 
regulations in the regions with the target of issuing regional regulations to support the KPH in the 
BLUD scheme. 
The internalisation of KPH development programs is intended to gather strength from various 
groups, including relevant government institutions and other parties (non-government) who are 
competent in forestry issues. This internalisation was marked by the public consultation about KPH 
development as an effort to develop an understanding of the KPH program and the 
institutionalisation of KPH development to the relevant actors. Institutionalising KPH development 
for related actors means that in making policies related to forest areas, these actors pay attention 
to, and link and synergise with, KPH development programs. Maryudi (2016) stated that the 
internalisation of development programs in the KPH is very closely related to the relationship 
between the KPH and other actors. 
In general, the KPH development program in North Sumatra Province has been internalised by 
the parties. In terms of public consultation, most of the parties were aware of the existence and 
function of the KPH. This knowledge was obtained from public consultation activities by the Forest 
Service and KPH or direct involvement in KPH activities. As for the institution of the KPH, other actors 
are marked by the facilitation of KPH activities, collaboration in the implementation of KPH activities 
and programs, synchronisation and coordination of the KPH work program, and research and 
community service activities. 
(3) The ratio of the use of forest areas by communities and corporations 
At the provincial level of North Sumatra, until January 2019, community rights and access to 
forests through the SF scheme continued to increase. Through the SF program, 102 licences were 
issued and the number of households involved were about 14,150 (Table 4). Table 4 shows that 
before 2014 (before the implementation of Law Number 23/2014), the forest land area managed 
by the community was only around 12,267.61 ha and it continued to increase until it reached 
61,961.95 ha in 2018. Further, it is estimated that there was additional area of approximately 
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49,694.34 ha by January 2019. Secco et al. (2014) and Fisher et al. (2018) stated that the addition to 
the SF schema area reflects an increase in community participation in forest management after the 
issuance of the SF policy through Regulation of MoEF Number P.83/2016. 
Table 4. Details of SF scheme area achievement in North Sumatra Province (until January 2019) 
No SF Scheme 




households <2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Amount 
1 HD 320.00 0 0 3,541.00 516.00 4,377.00 13 2,706 
2 HKm 137.00 610.00 0 5,690.00 25,352.00 31,789.00 47 6,502 
3 HTR 11,810.61 3,434.00 0 215.00 0 15,459.61 12 2,569 
4 KK 0 0 0 0 5,164.34 5,164.34 29 1,603 
5 HA 0 0 0 0 5,172.00 5,172.00 1 770 
Amount 12,267.61 4,044.00 0 9,446.00 36,204.34 61,961.95 102 14,150 
Source: 'Compiled by authors based on primary data collected in 2019. 
Note: HD: village forests; HKm: Community forestry; HTR: Community forest plantation; KK: Kemitraan Kehutanan or 
Forestry Partnership; HA: Customary forests. 
Despite an increase in the area of forest land managed by the community, this increase is still 
relatively small when compared with the total area of forest land managed by corporations, at about 
709,983 ha. As a percentage, the area of forest utilisation by the community has only reached 8%, 
whereas forest control by business actors has reached 92%. The limited proportion of forest 
management by the community is caused by the low achievement of the target area of the SF 
scheme. Suharjito (2017) and Hardiyanto et al. (2018) stated that some obstacles to achieve the 
target area of SF are caused by (1) inadequate regulatory support; (2) low political and financial 
support from local governments; (3) the low capacity and capability of the community; and (4) the 
lack of availability of assistants, which is not optimal in assisting prospective recipients of SF licences. 
(4) Reduced unofficial costs in managing licences and forest utilisation 
One GFG performance indicator is marked by transparency in forest management and is 
managed by personnel who have high integrity so that the practice of corruption and bribery as 
unofficial costs were no longer found in forestry businesses at every level of government (Corruption 
Eradication Commission/KPK, 2018; Secco et al., 2014; UNDP Indonesia, 2015). In North Sumatra 
Province, after the implementation of Law Number 23/2014, the transparency aspect in forest 
management, which is associated with gratuities in the management of licences and the utilisation 
of forest area, has shown significant improvements. 
Table 5. Matrix of opinions of business actors about managing licences and utilisation of forest area 
in North Sumatra Province 
No. Question Perception and percentage of respondent answers 
1 Reduction in the costs of 
forestry licensing 
All respondents (100%) stated that the maintenance fees were in accordance 
with the official costs. 
2 Purpose of providing 
unofficial fees 
All respondents (100%) stated that they did not currently provide unofficial 
(additional) costs while processing licences and using the area. However, 
previously, they often provided unofficial fees to speed up processing time. 
3 Time taken (process) to 
obtain a licence 
All respondents (100%) stated that during the 2015–2018 period, they did not 
perform activities and processes to obtain a new licence. However, 50% stated 
the normal process of submitting the annual work plan had been long, and 50% 
stated the process was still long. 
4 Grant of additional fees to 
government officials to 
accelerate exit licence 
All respondents (100%) stated that it was not fair. However, since the licensing 
process often takes time and the service time is not standardised, it encourages 
respondents ‘to look for other ways’ to ensure a faster licensing process.  
5 Conditions that require 
unofficial fees 
All respondents (100%) stated that they had never been forced to provide 
unofficial fees.  
6 Gift of money or goods to 
officials in gratitude on 
receiving permission 
All respondents (100%) stated that it was fair to offer a gift in gratitude. However, 
the gratitude should be expressed within normal limits, and money or goods 
need not be given. 
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No. Question Perception and percentage of respondent answers 
7 Government efforts to 
reduce transaction costs 
Among the respondents, 50% stated that there was a real effort to reduce 
unofficial costs, and 50% said that there were action plans, but they were not yet 
effective. 
Source: Interviews with four company leaders (August 2018), the holders of a business licence for using forest wood 
products. 
The results of interviews with respondents in North Sumatra Province reveal that the costs of 
arranging forest utilisation plans and of administering forest products are not burdensome; the 
respondents never provided, and nor were they forced to concede, unofficial costs; processes 
managing utilisation plans are undertaken in a normal timeframe; and real efforts have been made 
to reduce unofficial costs (Table 5). 
In North Sumatra Province, illegal fees have reduced after the implementation of Law Number 
23/2014 as supported by the following: the issuance of the Regulation of North Sumatra Governor 
2016 on anti-corruption; the application of innovations in the online forest product administration 
system; and the implementation of coordination, supervision and prevention of corruption in the 
North Sumatra Province by the KPK in the National Movement to Save Natural Resources Program 
(Corruption Eradication Commission/KPK, 2018; Kartodihardjo et al., 2015; UNDP Indonesia, 2015). 
3.2 Institutional Analysis of Forest Governance After the Implementation of the Law Number 
23/2014 
3.2.1 Jurisdiction of boundary 
The implementation of Law Number 23/2014 dismissed the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
regency/municipality forestry sector, thereby removing the range of control and effectiveness of 
forest management at the site level, which had been carried out by regencies/municipalities. In 
addition, in the division of sub-governmental affairs in the forestry sector between the central 
government and the provincial governments, the jurisdiction boundaries for provincial regions have 
narrowed. In this case, from the six sub-governmental affairs in the forestry sector, the provincial 
region does not have authority over the sub-affairs of forest planning and forestry supervision, 
which are reserved for the central government. 
The narrowing of jurisdictional boundaries under Law Number 23/2014 has meant that 
provinces, including North Sumatra, cannot fully support forest management activities, such as 
forest inventory, forest area gazettement, forest area stewardship, the establishment of forest 
management areas (as a forest planning sub-affair) and the supervision of forest management (as a 
forestry supervision sub-affair), in terms of both budget and implementation. This lack of support 
will certainly affect the implementation of forest governance institutions, and the provinces cannot 
expand their jurisdictional boundaries to increase the GFG performance achievement when the 
central government has not exercised its authority over the sub-affairs under its jurisdiction in 
provincial areas. 
In North Sumatra Province, a consequence of the narrowing of the jurisdiction boundary is 
visible in the performance indicator of ‘predetermined forest area’, which is only about 56.46% (or 
an area of 1,725,266.43 ha from 3,055,795.00 ha of the total forest area of this Province) until 2017. 
The incomplete determination of the entire forest area has made forest areas in North Sumatra 
Province prone to tenurial conflicts due to the claims of contesting parties. This situation has 
occurred despite the fact that completing the designation of all forest areas is among the most 
important steps needed to strengthen forest area certainty and clarify boundaries and claims for 
forest management areas. The determination of this forest area is also very useful in clarifying the 
boundaries of jurisdiction to all stakeholders, as a component of forest management that is 
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3.2.2 Rules of representation 
Law Number 23/2014 strongly encourages public (stakeholders’) participation in regional 
governance, including forest management. Public participation includes the following: (1) 
formulating regional regulations and regional policies to regulate forest management, and (2) 
planning, budgeting, implementing, monitoring and evaluating forest management. Further, it is 
expected that public participation will result in regional development policies in the forestry sector 
that accord with the objectives of forestry sector decentralisation; that is, to bring public services 
closer to the community and to manage forest resources in a sustainable manner for community 
welfare (Colfer & Capistrano, 2005). 
However, the opportunity to ensure community participation in practice has not encouraged 
local governments, including the North Sumatra Province, to produce policies in forest management 
that are in accordance with regional interests. This is in line with the results of studies that show 
that, after the implementation of Law Number 23/2014, the rules used in forest governance in North 
Sumatra Province are generally still dominated by regulations originating from the central 
government. In fact, the Provincial Government of North Sumatra has only been able to issue 
regulations directly related to forest management in the form of (1) Governor Regulation Number 
48/2017 on Duties, Functions, Job Descriptions and Work Procedures of the North Sumatra 
Provincial Forestry Service, which divides forest management organisations in North Sumatra 
Province into 16 KPH Areas and one Grand Forest Park Office; and (2) a draft of regional regulations 
on Management of the Forest Area of North Sumatra Province in 2019. 
After the implementation of Law Number 23/2014, the Provincial Government of North 
Sumatra has not made many representation rules on forest management under its authority, which 
exemplifies the lack of representation rules for forest management in the regions. Yusdiyanto (2012) 
stated that the low level of representation rules is caused by (1) a weakness in the hierarchical 
system of legislation, namely, that regional regulations made by provincial regions must refer to 
higher regulations, and (2) the low ability of provincial governments to compile policy (legislative 
process) regarding forest management. 
One example of the low level of representation rules for forest management in North Sumatra 
Province relates to the case of SF policy implementation. Until date, North Sumatra Province does 
not have a governor’s regulation regarding the facilitation of SF development as a form of governor’s 
representation rules. In accordance with the MoEF Regulation No. P.83/2016, the governor has the 
authority (right) in the decision-making process to grant the SF scheme licence as a form of 
delegation from the MoEF. From an economic perspective, if the governor exercises authority, it will 
reduce decision-making costs, thereby reducing the costs of economic transactions and accelerating 
the performance achievement of the SF scheme area. 
However, the delegation requires the provincial governments to have included the SF program 
in the provincial medium-term development plan and to have funding support as outlined in the 
provincial APBD. Because the delegation requirements have not been fulfilled, the application for 
the SF scheme in North Sumatra Province cannot be submitted to the governor and must be 
submitted to the MoEF . This condition influences the low performance as regards achieving the 
target area for forest management through the SF scheme. Data analysis shows that the 
development of the SF program in North Sumatra Province until January 2019 has only been realised 
up to an area of 61,961.95 ha (11.25%) as against the SF program target of 550,887 ha according to 
the Social Forestry Area Indicative Map of North Sumatra Province. 
Based on this explanation, the implementation of Law Number 23/2014 in the context of 
representation rules in North Sumatra Province indicates at least the following: (1) The narrowing 
of jurisdictional boundaries for provincial areas in forest management results in low representation 
rules in forest management; (2) the high dominance of the central government in drafting ‘uniform’ 
regulations reduces the opportunities for provincial regions to formulate regulations based on their 
uniqueness (local-specific) as a manifestation of the principle of representation, and (3) various 
requirements in implementing central government regulations contribute to the low performance 
as regards the achievement of the objectives of issuing these regulations. 
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3.2.3 Property rights 
Forests in North Sumatra Province are divided into state, private and customary forests, which 
indicates the legal certainty of property rights over forest resources. Regarding the status of state 
forests, the property rights lie with the state, which controls the rights to access, use and manage 
them. The state also has the right to transfer the rights to these goods/commodities to other parties 
(Hanna et al., 1996). Specifically, management rights related to state forests under a provincial 
authority (i.e. HP, HL and Tahura) are divided into three types: (a) self-management by KPH and 
Tahura, (b) transfer of management to individuals (private) through IUPHHK-natural 
forest/plantation forest and IUPHHK HTR schemes (individual licence holders) and (c) transfer of 
management to groups collectively (common) in the form of SF schemes, such as HKm, IUPHHK HTR 
(group licence holders), HD and KK. 
These three types of forest management rights are a form of transfer of temporary property 
rights granted by the government through a system of management rights and business permits in 
accordance with applicable regulations (Kartodihardjo, 2008; Nugroho, 2016). This transfer of 
ownership rights closely relates to clarity in determining who should manage the forest and who 
should receive the related benefits. In addition, clarity on the transfer of property rights is also 
important in regulating bundles of rights, such as the rights of access, withdrawal, management, 
exclusion and alienation. This is in accordance with the position of the rights holder, whether as 
owner, proprietor, claimant or user (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). 
In North Sumatra Province, property rights over state forests have generally received 
recognition from the government, which is strengthened in formal legal rules (de jure) for managers 
(KPH/Tahura) and permit holders (IUPHHK and holders of SF scheme) through a decree of the 
Minister of Environment and Forestry. For example, for KPH there is a Decree of the Minister of 
Forestry Number: SK. 102/Menhut-II/2010 dated 5 March 2010 on the Designation of Protected 
Forest Management Units and Production Forest Management Units of North Sumatra Province. 
The decree identified 14 KPHL units and 19 KPHP units. For the SF scheme, a Decree of the Minister 
of Environment and Forestry was issued in 2017 for 102 permits consisting of 47 HKm scheme 
permits, 29 KK scheme permits, 13 HD scheme permits, 12 HTR scheme permits and one Customary 
Forest scheme permit (Forestry Service of North Sumatra Province, 2019). These formal legal rules 
(legality) officially grant licence managers and holders a set of rights, such as accessing, utilising, 
managing, limiting and controlling other parties’ use of forest resources. In addition, this legality can 
minimise the level of conflicts caused by the claims of other parties in the management of forest 
resources and the land. 
Nevertheless, the legality of property rights over a forest area does not guarantee that it will 
be free from claims by other parties; thus, this situation may reduce the guarantees about property 
rights (Broegaard, 2005). In the Province of North Sumatra during 2018, there were 15 cases of 
forest area claims by the community, which resulted in tenurial conflicts; 21 cases of encroachment 
of forest areas; and many cases of illegal logging activities (Forestry Service of North Sumatra 
Province, 2019). 
After the implementation of Law Number 23/2014, North Sumatra Province also has problems 
regarding property rights to forest resources. This problem can be found in the level of rights of the 
manager and permit holder, which is generally limited to being a tenant (claimant), namely, the 
party who only has the rights to access, use and manage the property (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). 
As tenants, managers and licence holders must comply with the lessee’s rules, including the rules 
that limit tenants’ rights. For tenants, there are limitations to the rules of representation—they do 
not have the right to determine who can access, transfer and sell or rent the property. Owing to 
these limitations, property rights are imperfect, and hence, the allocation of forest resources is less 
efficient in the market economy (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973). In fact, property rights matter because 
they determine resource use. The more exclusive are the property rights to the individual or group, 
the greater the incentive to maintain the asset value. Further, more exclusive rights increase the 
incentive to improve the asset value through investment (Alston & Mueller, 2005). 
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3.3 Strategy for Strengthening Forest Governance Institutions in North Sumatra Province 
The institutional performance achievements and institutional analysis show that the 
implementation of Law Number 23/2014 has failed to significantly encourage the improvement of 
forest governance performance in provincial areas. Therefore, the institutional aspects of forest 
governance need strengthening as described in the following sections. 
3.3.1 Institutional innovation 
Institutional innovation is interpreted as an improvement in institutional aspects that, in turn, 
improves performance (Nugroho, 2016). This institutional improvement is a form of 
institutionalisation and serves as a legal umbrella to strengthen the effectiveness of the 
implementation of Law Number 23/2014 in supporting improved forest governance performance. 
1) Jurisdictional boundaries. The jurisdiction boundary for provincial regions can be extended so 
that they have full authority (autonomy) over all forest management sub-affairs. To this end, 
applicable regulations must be revised or the assistance mechanism for completing tasks related 
to the sub-affairs of forest planning and forestry supervision must be strengthened. Specifically, 
for successful task completion, in accordance with the applicable regulations, task assignment 
must be accompanied by the provision of financing, human resources support, technical 
assistance, and facilities and infrastructure. Assistance tasks can be directly assigned to the KPH 
as the site-level forest manager and task implementation can be coordinated with the UPT of 
MoEF in the regions. Apart from co-administration through KPHs, jurisdictional boundaries in 
forest management at the provincial level can also be expanded through a forestry partnership 
scheme. Such schemes are a multilevel, multi-actor method of forest governance, often referred 
to as polycentric governance (Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012). Multilevel governance enables parties 
such as ministerial and institutional officials (at the national, provincial and district levels), 
investors and residents to negotiate, formulate and implement forest management policies 
jointly. Meanwhile, multi-actor governance requires collaboration between different parties to 
achieve the goals of public policies (Forsyth, 2009). 
2) Representation rules. Institutional innovation in the rules of representation can be conducted 
by opening space for active participation in the national policy formulation process and by 
implementing a public consultation mechanism with stakeholders at the regional level. This 
effort is performed as a form of representation to ensure the public legitimacy of proposed 
policies. In addition, innovation can be brought about by strengthening the position of regional 
regulations in the hierarchical system of legislation by encouraging the emergence of various 
local-specific rules of representation at the site level, which would also serve as a manifestation 
of the rules of representation. Thus, clarity and accuracy of regulations will be generated 
according to regional needs and can be a control for resource sustainability (Ostrom, 1990). 
3) Property rights. Ownership rights over resources are often unclear; thus, open access can 
accelerate resource damage. Therefore, clear ownership rights are essential to (1) regulate the 
rights and obligations of rights holders, and (2) to provide certainty about the management and 
the current and future benefits that will be obtained (Pakpahan, 1989). Efforts that can be made 
include the following: (1) Community participation must be ensured in the process of 
determining forest areas so that there is legal (de jure) and real (de facto) recognition of land 
status. This recognition closely relates to the support of the community in managing an area 
(Contreras-Hermosilla & Fay, 2005; Corruption Eradication Commission/KPK, 2012). (2) The 
position of the managers and licence holders must be changed from being limited to ‘claimants’, 
namely, parties who only have the rights to access, use and manage the asset become 
‘proprietors’. With proprietary status, licence managers and holders will have access rights, use 
rights, management rights and exclusion rights. Through the right of exclusion, they will have the 
right to determine who can have access rights and select the method for transferring these 
access rights to other parties, such as through bequeathing/giving, but will not have the right to 
sell the asset (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). 
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3.3.2 Strengthening the capability of forestry actors in the regions 
Implementation of Law Number 23/2014 has encouraged the involvement of various actors in 
forest management in North Sumatra Province, that is, key, primary and supporting actors. As 
already explained, a component driving the success of forest governance is the actors’ capability. If 
the capability of key actors, such as the DPRD and the provincial governments, is strengthened, both 
would have high capacity in the legislation process related to forest management and the provincial 
governments’ political will to support GFG would increase. 
Strengthening the capabilities of the primary actors—particularly the KPH, permit holders and 
managers of the SF schemes—is intended to enable them to have the skills for site-level forest 
management. For KPHs, this capability strengthening would be very useful in developing forest 
management through the BLUD scheme. The Provincial Government of North Sumatra must 
prioritise the strengthening of KPH capabilities because KPH development is intended to address 
the need for forest management units at the site level and their management organisations to 
achieve forest sustainability. Meanwhile, for permit holders and managers of SF schemes, capability 
strengthening would contribute significantly to enhancing the values of entrepreneurship in using 
their business permits. 
4. Conclusion 
The withdrawal of forestry sector authority from regencies/municipalities to the provincial and 
central governments has failed to resolve fundamental, site-level problems in forest management. 
This situation illustrates that the implementation of Law Number 23/2014 has been ineffective in 
encouraging improvements in forest governance performance. This finding is based on the 
assessment of forest governance performance using a framework of the relationship between 
performance and institutional structure, forest resource characteristics and actors’ behaviour. The 
assessment results show that forest management authority is delegated in provincial and central 
forest areas with a centralised nuance, the characteristics of forest resources remain unchanged 
(i.e. these continue to be CPRs) and the behaviour of actors interested in forest management lacks 
synergy, resulting in low values for forest governance performance indicators. 
The results of an institutional analysis on the aspects of jurisdictional boundaries, the rules of 
representation and the ownership rights after the implementation of Law Number 23/2014 show 
that forest governance in a decentralised system, which divides authority between government 
levels, will be effective in supporting the success of forest governance performance provided the 
following conditions are met: (1) There is an appropriate, balanced division of authority between 
government levels based on capability and their respective needs. (2) The government and central 
institutions use a participatory approach to create and establish regulations or policies in which the 
decentralised system will be enforced. (3) There is tenure security and clarity of ownership, which 
will reduce claims and conflicts in the management and use of forest resources. (4) There is a legal 
umbrella and the capacity to resolve conflicts and negotiations between various parties who have 
varying levels of interest and power. 
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